Over the past few decades, the complex process of globalization has dissolved the traditional concept of state sovereignty and neutralized the clear distinction between national and international law. Thus, legal scholarship has formulate alternative conceptual schemes to frame the fragmentation of the new global legal order. In the paper, I focus on the two typically antithetical approaches of legal pluralism and global constitutionalism. Legal pluralism emphasizes the diversity and the multiplicity of the global legal realm, while global constitutionalism is traditionally related to concepts of unity and hierarchy, whose paradigmatic reference is the state. The aim of the inquiry is to establish a theoretical basis and provide the conceptual tools to reconcile the two opposite approaches, fi rst describing the main traits of each model, and then hypothesizing a hybrid model of plural constitutionalism. In the end, I will raise the question, from a constitutional but open point of view, whether it is really worth continuing to adopt a constitutional prospect. Alternative models (the GAL approach, for instance) may provide more suitable solutions for the complexity of the global legal world. However, a multiple model that attempts to reconcile different approaches, in correspondence to the multiplicity of the current global society, could be the best option.
Introduction
Over the past few decades, the complex process of globalization 1 has caused radical changes in today's legal world. Economic, cultural, political, social and migratory globalizing forces have dissolved the central power of the nation state into several sites of authority 2 around the world, and have diluted it to such an extent to undermine the traditional concept of state sovereignty. Inevitably, the classic categories national law/international law have become increasingly blurred and are not able to include anymore all the different manifestations of law in the world society.
international courts, and other bodies with a judicial or quasi-judicial nature, in shaping all those models. 5 Lastly, I will raise the question, from a constitutional but open point of view, whether it is really worth continuing to adopt a constitutional prospect. Alternative models (the GAL approach, for instance) may provide more suitable solutions for the complexity of the global legal world. However, at the end, a multiple model that attempts to reconcile different approaches, in correspondence to the multiplicity of the current global society, could be the best option. 6 The different strands of the current literature on legal pluralism share the preliminary assumption that clashes among multiple, overlapping legal systems are unavoidable, and sometimes might be even desirable. In fact, legal pluralism is a common condition, recurring in history: a rich legal pluralism characterized Europe in the medieval period, and the common law tradition has always been characterized by a pluralistic nature.
The model of legal pluralism
Today, pushed by the centrifugal forces of globalization, 7 pluralism has re-emerged after having been swept away by the consolidation of state power in the 19th century.
This newest notion of legal pluralism has started to be developed since the end of World War II, fi rst by legal anthropology and legal sociology, and then by comparative law, international law, and socio-legal studies. It is still a major topic in legal literature, and each discipline identifi es many different understandings of this term. Such a wide and general 5 The paper embraces the idea of judicial activity as a form of dialogue. Judicial dialogue is a vague and comprehensive concept, and may describe different scenarios: judges, involving also other judicial actors (quasi-judicial bodies, NGOs, private parties, lawyers, groups of experts, panel systems, human rights organizations, etc.) cite each other's decisions, looking beyond their own borders, even when they are not formally compelled to do so, engage in transnational cooperation, but also attend conferences, have face-to-face meetings, and generally become increasingly aware of transnational legal developments. Among all of these dialogical events, the paper chooses to consider just the narrow notion of dialogue as the tendency of national (constitutional and supreme), supranational, and international courts to refer to each other's decisions in their adjudicatory activity. 6 An inquiry on the defi nition of legal pluralism could be the object of an autonomous, more exhaustive research, which is beyond the scope of the present paper, but which I would like to undertake soon. I suggest an essential bibliography: Teubner, G. 7 It is worth noting that globalization has unleashed centripetal forces, too. Robertson uses the term glocalization to mean the mutual contamination between centrifugal and centripetal forces, local and global trends. Globalization has produced a double direction movement: global law absorbs specifi c rules from each single legal orders through a bottom-up approach (universalization), and global law permeates each single legal orders through a top-down approach (de-nationalization). Robertson, R.: Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity. In: Featherston, M.-Lash, S.-Robertson, R.: Global Modernities. London, 1995. concept requires an immediate clarifi cation about the meaning that I intend to adopt in this work.
In 1986, in his seminal work What is Legal Pluralism?, John Griffi ths summarized and consolidated the results of the legal pluralist scholars achieved until then, and provided the basic defi nition of legal pluralism as "the presence in a social fi eld of more than one legal order".
8 Radically anti-statist and anti-positivist, Griffi ths affi rmed that "Legal pluralism is the fact. Legal centralism is a myth, an ideal, a claim, an illusion". 9 He draws on the idea of ubi societas, ibi ius 10 by Santi Romano.
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For the purposes of this paper, I will share Griffi ths' anti-statist position. However, I will not adopt here his sociological and anthropological classic point of view, as it limits the object of inquiry to the relations between "multiple layers of law, usually with different sources of legitimacy, that exist within a single state or society". 12 Rather, I intend to adhere to those theories that apply a pluralist framework to the global scenario, in order to conceptualize "a world of hybrid legal spaces, where a single act or actor is potentially regulated by multiple legal or quasi-legal regimes". 13 This kind of legal pluralism doctrine seeks to provide a more realistic alternative to the two traditional theories that interpret the legal world either as a structure of formal state-to-state relations or as an overarching framework of universal norms like in a sort of Hobbesian cosmopolitanism.
The goal of the model of legal pluralism is to observe and describe the global legal space-regulated by a system of global governance-, 14 and realize its condition of profound fragmentation, respecting and preserving it, and at once bringing to light a both internal and external systemic coherence.
Trying to outline the results of the studies on fragmentation, one could say that the pluralist theorists consider fragmentation essentially from two different points of view. On the one hand, fragmentation can be understood as a multi-layered fragmentation, along a vertical axis composed by the States, the supranational or regional bodies, and the international organizations. It is a fragmentation across different levels of governance, from 8 Griffi ths: op. cit. 1. 9 Ibid. 4. 10 Romano, S.: L'ordinamento giuridico. Pisa, 1918. 11 The current concept of legal pluralism is the outcome of the legacy of the past combined with more recent developments connected to the process of globalization. We are witnessing to the reemergence of a social condition which is very similar in its dynamics to the medieval world. It has revived the idea that law cannot be separated from society, as law is already written in the social "tissue" (Harding, global, through international, supranational, and fi nally domestic spheres. On the other hand, fragmentation can be intended as a segmentation in a wide range of single regulatory regimes, placed side by side or overlapping on a horizontal plane in the global sphere, each exercising recognizably public governance functions.
In this paper, I prefer to adopt, instead, one single point of view confronting the fragmentation of the global space as a whole: a vision from a panoramic viewpoint, from the top of a hill, that can grasp the plurality of legal orders, put all on the same level, like "islands" in the sea, 15 connected through bridges, approaching or overlapping like driven by a plate tectonics.
Moreover, what is stressed by the theorists of legal pluralism is not merely multiplicity or diversity, but rather the absence of a set hierarchical model of interaction and the lack of an overarching unity. Also, to remain consistent with the character of absence of hierarchy, in the paper I choose not to deal with my issue distinguishing between the European dimension and the international one. An analysis of legal pluralism and global constitutionalism, fi rst in the European Union, and then in the global context, could be misleading and bring back to a perspective of hierarchical multi-level protection, involving well-known mechanisms of primacy, direct effects and counter-limits. I prefer to envisage the global dimension as a horizontal, moving, dynamic structure, where a multiplicity of actors and different sites of authority exercise those public powers that tend to escape the exclusive state control. States, supranational organizations, international organizations, hybrid public-private and purely private "self-creating or unoffi cial" 16 bodies, share public power in several matters such as trade, investments, environment, fi shing, sport, aviation, security, agriculture, food, media, Internet, weapons, fi nancial crisis, terrorism, labour, refugees, pharmaceutical products. Regulatory roles often overlap. In several areas there is more than one regulatory authority, each one with different jurisdiction, and this leads, in turn, to the institution of further bodies to coordinate them.
The world society is subject to a real sectorialization. Accordingly, the regulatory disciplines cannot follow a single model, effective for each sector, but they have to vary according to specifi c needs, to the functions to be performed sector by sector. Pluralism is an unavoidable and irreversible consequence of the functional differentiation: while at the national level the principle of separation of powers regulates the relations between the organs of the state, at the global level it is at most a criterion of division of functions that operates. 17 The sectorialization of the system-the specifi city of each regime, as well as the differentiation of the rule-makers-is refl ected also by the inequality of the guarantees available for the individuals: the disciplines of each sphere present a diversifi cation in the substance of their contents, indeed rights guaranteed in one of these regulatory spheres are not directly the same in other spheres. Furthermore, multiplication of judicial bodies, together with an increasing body of case law, is overlapping and accumulating (juridifi cation; judicial ubiquity 19 ). It follows diversity in the substance and also in the enforcement of rights. The process of enforcement of rights establishes many different degrees of protection, for at least three main reasons: fi rstly, each sectoral regime decides on the establishment of judicial bodies so it happens that regimes with a court co-exist with regimes that do not have it; secondly, when judicial bodies are established, they can present a different degree of maturation and effectiveness; lastly, so there are different regulatory regimes dealing with the same sector as there are different dispute settlement bodies.
Relentlessly, fragmentation multiplies as if we saw it through a kaleidoscope. Nonetheless, it is not a chaos since each regime is not ab-solutus: according to the pluralist scholars, there is a continuous compenetration between the various regulatory regimes (e.g. between the rules of the special regimes and the general international law, between the law of the member states of European Union and the Union law, etc.). On the contrary, some theorists of fragmentation have depicted those sites of authority as selfcontained, self-enclosed, and self-referential regimes, a sort of isolated and self-suffi cient monads, with no compenetration, asserting that each system is independent from the general normative framework constituted by the international legal order and act in a "clinical vacuum".
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In sum, the theory of legal pluralism "is not just an external description of the constitutional landscape, but is corroborated and reinforced by the deepest role selfunderstanding of the key actors themselves". 21 Legal pluralism involves the commitment to the common recognition and accommodation of the diverse parts notwithstanding their diversity. This is the crucial factor that distinguishes pluralism from plurality: the plurality remains mere plurality when the different sites of authority are conceived of as separated, fragmented in self-enclosed and self-referential regimes. Instead, the plurality turns into pluralism whether the different expressions of public power are considered connected to each other 22 and the actors of this plurality are conscious that their own existence depends on their reciprocal relationships. 's book is entitled "The plurality of the legal orders and their relationships": it is interesting to notice that Romano, after having realized the plurality of the legal orders, considers appealing that a jurist deals also with the reciprocal relationships and interactions between such legal orders, their mutual indifference or recognition, and identifi es the essence of pluralism in its ordering nature, its interdependence, its dynamic and living condition.
The model of global constitutionalism
The international legal order, or the system of global governance, grows up spontaneously, not according to a plan or a political will (political scientists talk about "governance without government" 23 ), indeed, even if it had its origin in the states, it has become increasingly less dependent on them. Consequently, it appears plausible to whom conceives the constitution as consistent to the traditional domestic model, that the global legal order does not rest on any constitutional basis. 24 In which sense, then, can we talk about a global constitutionalism? The concept of global constitutionalism is not universally undisputed, and raises skepticism among many scholars. It is not easy to overcome the variety of global constitutionalism literature and the terminological ambiguity to seek and formulate a more straightforward concept of global constitutionalism in order to provide, at least, a common platform to debate it.
Traditionally, the roots of global constitutionalism go back to the post World War II period, when many countries around the world adopted constitutions or bills of rights and established forms of judicial review. The basic function of constitutionalism, deeply dependent on the existence of a written and entrenched constitution put into place by the pouvoir constituant, consists in keeping politics in check and limiting the government, in full compliance with the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances. Therefore, constitutionalism is essential for the survival of democracy, as the opposite is true as well, that democracy is fundamental for the existence itself of constitutionalism. 25 Then, the quality "global" identifi es the tendency of a domestic notion, that one of constitutionalism, to become common to many countries all over the world.
Thus, in its original phase, 26 global constitutionalism was still tightly tied to the idea of modern nation state, but soon constitutional features would gradually begin to emerge in the international legal order, specifi cally in the context of supranational arrangements, like the European Union (EU), and other international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN).
Once this process is started, it is not diffi cult to gather how much the concept of global constitutionalism has quickly changed in the current constitutional debate.
Originally, global constitutionalism described the worldwide spreading of typically national circumstances, something deeply bound to the state model, but then it appeared less and less tied to national borders, and progressively ceased to identify a clear-cut phenomenon and became an empty box, a theoretical framework through which legal scholarship tried to interpret what was happening on the global fi eld. A proper global constitutional project has now developed as a sort of umbrella notion which covers a broad range of theories seeking to observe and interpret the international dimension through constitutional lenses. These theories have quite different scopes, some just explaining, describing, and mapping, others also shaping and formulating concrete proposals, still others trying to do both; and their fi eld of observation also varies from the global domain as a whole to specifi c institutional contexts.
According to these theories, constitutionalism has gone through a paradox: de facto it moves beyond national borders and emancipates itself from nation states, but de iure it remains "unbound", 27 without any formal anchorage or legitimacy. To fi ll this void, global constitutionalists have developed many different explanations, all starting from the assumption that there are empirical signs and indicators that the international legal order, although pluralistic in structure, is going through a process of "constitutionalization".
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Most of global constitutionalist approaches do nothing else but uncritically transfer the state paradigm to the global society. Among those, the one we could refer to as proper global constitutional approach, 29 emphasizes, as a reaction against and a response to fragmentation, the existence of an overarching constitutional framework encompassing the entire global legal system, and assumes a high level of global consensus on shared ethical values.
This monolithic approach to global constitutionalism varies from some versions that claim an institutional constitutional order-the constitution of the European Union, or the United Nation's world order constitution, 30 -to others that advocate an informal constitutionalisation, a "constitutionalisation of international law", 31 based on a "higher law 27 Wiener, A.: Constitutionalism Unbound: A Practice Approach to Normativity. Paper prepared for presentation at the round- constitution", 32 or a "multi-tiered system of governance founded on higher law constitutionalism". 33 Both of those monistic strands, however, have in common closure and a tendency towards a new reduction to unity, that attempt to keep following the old familiar standard of a national constitution within a single hierarchically layered legal and political system. This sort of constitutional theories are often constructed with reference to comparative constitutional law. 34 Taking for granted for the moment that judicial bodies are the institutions that most contribute to order the global space, 35 we could say that the constitutional function of judges is specular to the classic notion of constitution. A national constitution establishes governmental institutions, such as legislatures, executives, and courts, and grants them the power to make, apply, enforce, and interpret laws, and also indicates how the various institutions are expected to interact with one another. We can affi rm that judges have a constitutional function, though not depending on any formal constitutional mandate: such a strand of constitutional thinking is based on the idea of a material, substantial, not formal, constitution, considered more as a process rather than as a particular institutional form or structure. Post World War II constitutions usually contain also a catalogue of fundamental rights and liberties that is expected to be enacted by the legislative power, and establish procedures and institutions for protecting rights against political interference, typically in the form of judicial review ("higher law constitution"). Judicial bodies in the new global order have a constitutional function also concerning fundamental rights: they are engaged in a dialogue with foreign courts and interpret foreign constitutions, in doing so they create a common core of values and principles, a common frame of reference 36 and establish a sort of jurisprudential circle of human rights, replacing an inactive legislator in giving protection to fundamental rights.
One more observation on the argumentation that derives from the historical double meaning of the term "constitution" as something defi ned that has already settled to represent a political community, but also as a dynamic and ongoing process that is developing over time in a dialectic evolution with the underlying community. 37 Playing on the constitutive ambiguity of the term constitution itself, the potential elements against the idea of a global constitution can be simply interpreted as a proof of its rudimentary and embryonic nature, its "emerging" 38 character, its function as premise and telos at the same time. Also, according to this idea, UN, WTO, EU or other regional bodies can be defi ned as "constitutional" sites of authority. However, this claim is a double-edge sword since it hides some risks that could undermine the basis of this brand of global constitutional thinking: should the constitutional character of some of the entities that coexist in the global world be viewed as an evidence, or even as a reference model, for a broader global constitutional system, or rather, on the contrary, are they indicative of the absence of any overarching constitutional order at the global level?
A sharper objection concludes that, if the object of global constitutionalism-a fully shaped global constitution-does not exist yet, this should be enough to persuade that a global constitution is just a speculative project, for some others even a totally unrealistic option.
Nonetheless, the major objection to a global constitutional framework is that such a model does not refl ect, least of all respect, the pluralistic nature of the reality, rather tends to neutralize and negate it, driven by the ambition of an utopian reduction to unity, claiming to re-impose order and re-establish hierarchy.
Towards the middle way of Plural Constitutionalism
The global constitutionalism model outlined in the previous section seems to confi rm the view that "any measure of legal pluralism is inversely proportional to any measure of constitutional order".
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The aim of the paper is to challenge this view and seek to reconcile pluralism and constitutionalism. Pluralism is an inevitable-it represents the conditions we are living-and a more desirable alternative to the pretending unity claimed by the global constitutional discourse, 40 but also the idea implied in the concept of constitutionalism of "a single authorizing register for the political domain as a whole" 41 is consistent with and necessary to the global society.
In the second part of the paper, I described the global legal world of today as a huge horizontal fi eld where many different players coexist, collide, and build linkages in mutual cooperation through an active dialogue. This plurality of orders on the same plane needs a 39 Stone Sweet: Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regime. op. cit. 631, using this sentence just to contradict it. 40 The invocation of universal norms of human rights is used to to provide political legitimation in absence of a political centre. Human rights argumentation, considering their universal recognition and their evocative and symbolic appeal of universal topoi, is one of the most powerful ways to gain the adherence of the audience for an author. Human rights have the appearance of being able to transcend constitutionalism and act as a source of legitimation. But if at a general level we can agree that general values exist (but we could debated also on this assumption), when we apply those values to a concrete case they become immediately controversial, the problem is not that authoritative interpretative bodies for concretising putatively universal values expressed in HR are lacking, rather is that those values do not mean the same thing. Value diversity is insourmountable, and there is even the risk of a Western imperialism. Pluralism is an ethically preferable alternative to the unrealistic unity implied in global constitutional discourse. Constitutional pluralism is a better option as it satisfi es the substantial requirements, and refl ects the societal and private interests (Ferrarese: Prima lezione di diritto globale. op. cit.), closer to a sort of global technocracy that escapes from the traditional forms of top-down accountability related to the democratic mechanisms and that fi nds its legitimation in effectiveness, effi ciency, output pragmatic architecture and conceptual tools to be properly understood. To this end, legal pluralism certainly recognizes an external normative coherence of the global order, identifying relatively stable relationships between the different sites of authority. Yet these interactions remain mere coincidences and contingent connections of distinct identities.
A step forward is made by more nuanced, "modest" strands of academic global constitutionalism literature, which could be called transnational constitutionalism approaches, 42 and in particular by the theory of plural constitutionalism, or constitutional pluralism, 43 mainly developed by Neil Walker. 44 This theory aims at the reconciliation of plurality in constitutionally meaning terms. To this end, it goes through various stages. Firstly, constitutional pluralist scholars realize the pluralistic essence of the contemporary legal world, making use of the outcomes of the legal pluralism studies as a starting point. Secondly, they recognize to each non-state legal order its own independent constitutional claims, and respect every distinct constitutional site-national, supranational, international-. Thirdly, they provide a normative sense to the global space, recognizing not only single constitutional identities but also the proper constitutional quality of their mutual relationships. The cooperative dimension between constitutional units cannot be represented anymore either by the old Westphalian order of fully sovereign states, or by an equally fully sovereign global state with a global constitution that absorbs and replaces the existing different sites of authority, repositioning the onedimensional sovereign order. Constitutional pluralism provides an alternative interpretation of these connections, playing a crucial role in fostering the conditions under which these connections may occur, and thus progressively stabilizing them.
In this manner, the plurality of constitutional sites is embraced into a "constitutionally reconciled" 45 legal space, although each site develops a constitutional quality in accordance with the particular traditions, social pressures and normative dynamics peculiar to that site itself. Indeed, there is a process of constitutionalisation but there is also the awareness that it is impossible to keep following the "reduction to unity" ambition of the traditional global constitutionalism.
We could try to imagine two opposing poles of a line: one is the fragmentation, which is legal pluralism to excess, the chaos; the other one is the global constitutionalism in its most radical expression that is a hierarchical overarching legal order, where every form of pluralism has been erased. These two extremes gradually loose part of their strong characterization when they start to converge.
The line that links those two points is represented by plural constitutionalism. Therefore, plural constitutionalism, or constitutional pluralism if we start to "walk" from the pluralism extreme, is more a process of constitutionalisation, a double path that starts from two opposite poles and seeks to reach a middle way where pluralism and constitutionalism fi nd a balance.
Therefore, in the current constitutional debate, the issue at stake should concern how we can use the concept of constitutionalism, and not if we can use it or not (all or nothing). 46 Nowadays, there is no unitary template to decide whether constitutional status is achieved or not, but there are some criteria and standards in terms of which forms of constitutionalism can be distinguished and degrees of constitutionalisation can be identifi ed. Thus, many scholars have reassessed the strong concept of constitutionalism, elaborating substitute models such as of "lite", 47 or "compensatory" 48 constitutionalism, or even viewing constitutionalism more as a "mindset" 49 or a "sensibility". 50 As I argued in the third section of the paper, constitutionalism starts to become an empty box, when it goes beyond the national borders.
The idea of plural constitutionalism started to be shaped in the context of the studies of the constitutional dimensions of European Union. The European Union has been a kind of original "comfort zone" 51 for the ideas of constitutional pluralism since the Union does appear to possess a constitutional character of sorts (the doctrine of primacy and direct effects; the governance institutional architecture), to have a material constitution-which is thinner, and not thicker as it would be if the formal European Constitution have been approved-, and to establish occasionally interactions with other constitutional identities (the member States).
The idea of plural constitutionalism, in particular, acquires an instant vividness and concreteness from the relationships between national-supreme and constitutional-courts and supranational courts. Courts have a crucial role: they are aware of deciding the specifi c concrete case, but also of acting in a broader context which their decisions contribute to built. They develop close structural and cultural connections (bridges, passerelle 52 ) between the different regimes, and, according to those scholars who endorse the process of constitutionalisation, it is plausible that this judicial dialogue may be the key for the construction of properly constitutional relations.
The well-known Kadi judgement 53 may well prove how judges are exerting a constitutional function, determining the relationships between the different legal layers, here in particular between European Union law and international law. Kadi stands for a new "bottom-up" 54 process in which a regional court, the European Court of Justice, tries to persuade the UN Security Council to change its policy towards fundamental rights.
Through this approach, which is very similar to the so-called "Solange stance", 55 judges are building not a hierarchical, pyramidal order, according to a view related to the supremacy of a supranational order, rather they focus on the global dimension, and create a circular network with weak or even absent hierarchies 56 : a pyramid without its vertex.
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Then, the model of plural constitutionalism begins to be conceived also and most of all beyond the European context. We are witnessing the development of new transnational forms of constitutionalism driven by the functional specialism of the increasingly autonomous spheres of the global society ("societal constitutionalism"; 58 "sectoral constitutionalization" 59 ). Nonetheless, can we really state that the process of constitutionalisation of the global order is fully completed?
Instance of the European Communities and annulled the regulations of the Council of European Union implementing the resolutions of the UN Security Council that had placed Mr. Kadi, citizen of Saudi Arabia with important relations with the European Union, and the Al Barakaat International Foundation, based in Sweden, on the list whose funds were to be frozen on suspicion of fi nancing terrorism. The reason of the judgement is that the Court found a breach of fundamental rights guaranteed at the level of the European Union: the right to be heard, the right to property and the principle of proportionality, the right to an effective legal remedy/judicial review. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) reviews the validity of a Community act in the light of fundamental rights. This review "must be considered to be the expression, in a community based on the rule of law, of a constitutional guarantee stemming from the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal system which is not to be prejudiced by an international agreement" (para. 316). The European Court does not establish a new hierarchical structure regarding the interaction between international law and European law. Rather, the Court emphasizes the primacy of obligations under the UN Charter, but at the same time, by emphasizing the rule of law, states that the judicial review also covers all Community acts, even if they are designed merely to give effect to resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council. This is an approach of reciprocal concessions. If there were a real confl ict between obligations arising under the UN Charter on the one hand and EU fundamental rights as "principles that form part of the very foundations of the Community legal order" (para. 304) on the other, EU fundamental rights have to prevail. In his opinion, the former Advocate General of ECJ Miguel Maduro: "Measures which are incompatible with the observance of human rights […] are not acceptable in the Community". Maduro stated, inter alia, that "the relationship between international law and the Community legal order is governed by the Community legal order itself, and international law can permeate that legal order only under the conditions set by the constitutional principles of the Community". 54 
